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Abstract
The main emphasis of this article is focused on the growing problem of structural
unemployment in selected group of transition countries. Namely, if a certain region
has a greater degree of unemployment rate than the frictional one, and if another
region shows greater number of available vacancies than in conditions of frictional
unemployment, it is referred to as structural disequilibrium or mismatch. Such
unemployment is called structural unemployment. The estimates clearly show that
the mismatch explains only a portion of unemployment and could be considered as a
factor of increased unemployment. The empirical study refers to measuring the
structural unemployment caused by regional mismatch in selected transition
countries by known theoretical methods of mismatch indicators. The empirical
findings of the cross-country data sets suggest that the values for the particular
mismatch indicators differ in a great extent. Therefore, it is very hard to estimate the
real size of structural unemployment. The measured values for all mismatch
indicators cannot give a uniform conclusion, but they show corresponding trend.
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1. Introduction
Stable high unemployment rates and low participation of workers in the labour force
along with moderate economic growth in the majority of developed and transition
European countries indicate complex change in the labour market. The
unemployment problem is not as simple as it seems at the first sight, i. e. it does not
concern the supply and demand disequilibrium in the labour market only. This is
particularly not the case of the transition countries that have undergone the
transformation process from the pre-transition economic system into the
market-basedeconomy.Thepaperwillprimarilyfocusonthenewlyarisenstructural
changes in the labour market caused by the restructuring process. These changes in
the labour market lead to the disequilibrium between labour demand and supply,
which could be intensified by low geographic mobility, results in the regional
maladjustment (mismatch) between the existing regional labour force and the
existing demand. Such regional disequilibrium between the labour demand and
supply leads to a linking lack of opportunities for the unemployed persons and the
available vacancies, which requires an analysis of regional mismatch.
The concept of mismatch can be simply defined as the existence of a disequilibrium or a
maladjustment between labour supply and demand, more precisely, the notion of
mismatch shows the impossibility of connecting the existing unemployment and
vacanciesatadisaggregatedlevel.Theexistinglaboursupplyisfindingitmoreandmore
difficult to adapt to the changeable labour demand, in connection with the increasing
competitiveness at the global market and the accelerated technological changes. The
most quoted definition
3 of the concept of mismatch is by Turvey (Turvey, 1977: 210)
“…there is a mismatch between vacant jobs and unemployed workers such that if the
latter were available with different skills and/or in different places the level of
unemploymentwouldfall”.Basedonthisdefinition,theunemploymentandvacanciesin
this paper are compared at a well-defined disaggregated level.
The type of unemployment caused by mismatch is characterised by simultaneous
existence of the labour demand and supply surpluses (concurrent existence of a large
number of the unemployed and the large number of vacancies) or the disequilibrium
at some micro market. If there is a labour demand or supply surplus at some micro
market or region, then structural disequilibrium or mismatch appears, which hints at
the existence of structural unemployment. If there is no mismatch in the labour
market, conditionally it could be concluded that the equilibrium between the labour
demand and supply is established. Therefore, even if there is no mismatch it is not
possible toexpecttheunemploymentratestoequalthevacancy ratesattheaggregate
or regional levels (Jackman, Roper, 1987: 10). In that way, the labour market is not
likelytoachievecompleteequilibrium,whichdifferentiatesitfromgoodsandmoney
markets. From Turvey’s (1977) definition, it is obvious that the concept of mismatch
cannot be identified by simple facing unemployed workers with vacancies at the
56
3 Manyauthorsquotedthisdefinitionintheirwork,amongthemalsoJackman,Roper(1987)andEntorf(1998).
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pool of the unemployed, newly unemployed and vacancies at some disaggregated
level. In this article the concept of mismatch is examined in the selected transition
countriesontheregionallevelbyknowntheoreticalmethodsofmismatchindicators.
The concept of mismatch is also more often considered as the main reason of the
persistent high unemployment in the EU, because relatively high growth rates in the
last twenty years can hardly explain the situation of relatively high unemployment
rates. Therefore, the mismatch or maladjustment between the vacancies and the
unemployed is emphasised as the main cause. In case of transition countries, the
increaseinGDPfrom1995iscontinually tiedwithanincreaseinemployment,butso
far the increase in employment is small relatively compared to the increase in the
GDP. This means that hidden unemployment has decreased, or that there is a high
degree of mismatch between the labour supply and demand. The presence of a high
mismatch is the result of significant changes in the structure of product markets
during the 1990s in transition countries, which has brought about changes in the
structure of the labour demand, uncoordinated with the labour supply. This
maladjustment, or better say labour market rigidity, may have been due to low
geographic mobility and low skills mobility related to housing problems and to
workers’ unwillingness or inability to retrain (Rogut, et al., 2002: 63). Weak
efficiency of the labour market at the beginning of the transition process could be
explained by the fact that employment offices and the unemployed were
unaccustomed to the new competitive market economy or active search for jobs.
For analysing the contemporary matching problems in the labour marketsof national
economies, it is necessary to understand the appropriate theoretical framework and
carry out conclusions on the basis of accessible data and econometric models.
Therefore, firstly it is important to estimate the standard measures of mismatch i. e.
mismatch indicators. Most of the indicators
4 during the 1980s do not show a
significant increase of mismatch according to qualification levels (Padoa Schioppa,
1991a).Theempiricalresultsofthemismatchindicatorsattheregionallevelsareless
doubtful and show existence of increasing regional mismatch(Abraham,1991: 478).
This empirical analysis refers to the measurement of the structural unemployment
caused by regional mismatch in the selected transition countries.
Our research focuses on the increasing structural unemployment problem by
measuring the mismatch indicators in Croatia and CEEC-5 (Central and Eastern
European countries – Czech Republic, Hungary
5, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia). A
comparison between Croatian and CEEC-5 labour markets is provided since this
selected group of countries is the most developed group among the transition
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4 These indicators were used by Jackman, Layard, Savouri (1991), Layard, Nickell, Jackman (1991) and Padoa
Schioppa (1991a). Layard, Nickell, Jackman have found out proofs of increasing mismatch only in Sweden
(Layard, Nickell, Jackman, 1991: 329) and showed that the level of mismatch in Great Britain accounts for
approximately 30% of the total unemployment (Layard, Nickell, Jackman, 1991: 310).
5 As the data for Hungary is not available at the disaggregated level by region mismatch measuring was not
possible.
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countries (according to the level of GDP per capita) joining the EU in 2004. This
group of countries madea significant progress among the transition countries as they
had implemented market reforms, established macroeconomic stability, price and
market liberalization, introduced new regulations for foreign direct investments, and
privatised thestatefirms.CroatiaaspirestobecomethememberoftheEUinthenear
future. An analysis of labour market mismatch indicators could be valuable for
Croatia’s economic policy. Keeping this in mind, we try to analyse Croatian labour
market maladjustments and compare to the group of most developed countries that
have recently (in May 2004) joint to the EU.
2. Methodological issues
Considering the fact that the results of measuring mismatch are important for
developing suitable policies in the labour market, they have to provide an
unambiguous argument. As previously mentioned, the maladjustment between the
labour supply and demand is considered as the main cause of structural
unemployment or labour market mismatch. Methodologically many labour
economists
6 stress that it is hard to define clearly the concept of mismatch and,
therefore,hardertodefinepropermismatchmeasures.However,inlaboureconomics
three approaches are familiar (Padoa Schioppa, 1991a: 1).
The first one associates mismatch with short-run sectoral shocks, which usually
balance out at the aggregate level, but temporarily increase both unemployment and
vacancies. Other two approaches examine mismatch as a more permanent and
continuous phenomenon.
Second approach stresses that frictional unemployment is unavoidable. It defines
mismatch as the distance between the unemployment rate and an optimal
unemploymentrate.“Optimal”assumesthat,atgiven vacancy rates,theallocation of
unemployed persons among regions (or occupations, skills, etc.) maximizes
employment. The optimal rate is established when the vacancy/unemployment ratio
(V/U, where V stands for the number of vacancies and U for the number of
unemployed) is equal at all micro markets. The corresponding mismatch indicators
measure the intersectoral dispersion of V/U ratios (Jackman, et al., 1987).
Third approach, defines mismatch as a distance between the unemployment rate and
a minimum rate, harmonized with the stable price level. This minimum is reached
undertheassumptionoftheNAIRUframeworkbywhichallunemploymentratesare
identical at every micro market. The corresponding mismatchindicator measuresthe
variance of the relative unemployment rates in an economy (Jackman, et al., 1991).
Still there is no unique opinion about the relative importance of potential causes of
increased unemployment. However, estimations about absolute importance of mis-
58
6 See more in Padoa Schioppa (1991b).
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proportion of unemployment caused by mismatch in total German unemployment has
been estimated at around 20% (SVR, 1994: 254), and in Great Britain around one third
of total unemployment (Jackman, et al., 1991: 71). These estimates clearly show that
mismatch accounts for only a portion of total unemployment and could be considered
as a cause of increased unemployment. This empirical analysis focuses precisely on
determining the unemployment caused by mismatch, in other words, on determining
the proportion of structural unemployment.
Previous empirical results show that problems, when measuring mismatch in the
labour market, can result from initial circumstances that researchers meet
occasionally. One problem is related to the data that is too little disaggregated.
Another likely problem could be related to the data considering vacancies which
come from official statistics and include only those job searchers who are registered
at the employment offices. In the real world it is common that there is a small part of
job searchers who never register at the employment offices, because they solve their
unemployed status at the labour market with their acquaintances, intelligence and/or
self-employment. Therefore, employers never register that number of vacancies at
theemploymentoffices.Thenumberofjobsearcherswhowillfindajobontheirown
is hard to estimate
7. Incomplete initial data about vacancies point out that agregate
mismatch indicators could show completely different results from disaggregated
ones. Therefore, measuring mismatch in the labour market could lead to rather
questionable conclusions.
The empirical analysis of measuring mismatch in the labour market in this paper is
based on disaggregated data on regional level (NUTS
8 2). Labour Force Survey does
not include the data on labour demand, which explains why the registered data from
employment offices is used. This figure is also not the most adequate one. It causes a
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LEVEL Minimum Maximum
NUTS 1 3 million 7 million
NUTS 2 800 000 3 million
NUTS 3 150 000 800 000
7 German institute for labour and profession research (Institute für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB),
GermanEmploymentInstitute)initsresearchfrom1990 comestoaconclusion thatonly40% of allvacancies are
mediated through employment offices. That number is a little higher for unskilled workers (47%) while it is
smallerfortheskilled(around38%)whichislogical,becausethereisagreaterpossibilitythatthesecondgroupis
more efficient in finding a job then the first one (Reyer, Spitznagel, Kretschmer, 1990).
8 NUTS - Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. Regional division in selected group of countries is
adequate to regional division NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 of European Union. This classification was established by
Eurostat in 1988 following unique regional statistics of EU. According to this classification distribution, the
regional division NUTS 1 level designates country, distribution according to the regional division NUTS 2 level
designates macro-regions, and distribution according to the NUTS 3 designates micro-regions.
The NUTS Regulation lays down the following minimum and maximum thresholds for the average size of the
NUTS regions:
See more in the document: “Introduction to the NUTS and the Statistical regions of Europe” on:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts/introduction_regions_en.html
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severe underestimation of labour demand, especially in the more dynamic labour
markets where many new jobs are created in small, often not perfectly legal private
companies. Yet, contrary to the situation in most OECD countries, in transition
countries employers are generally required to report vacancies to the public
employment office. Moreover, compared to their counterparts in OECD countries,
employers in transition countries generally have a smaller range of possibilities
available to them to advertise vacancies outside official registers (Boeri, 1994: 9).
The problem of using data from Labour Force Survey is also connected with short
time-series, because in some selected countries it has been in use since 1996. For
example, the Czech Republic started to collect data according to the regional
classification NUTS 2 during 2001 (Franco, 2002: 10).
3. Theoretical overview of available methods of measuring mismatch
To successfully estimate the presence of mismatch in the labour market of an
economy it is necessary to have appropriate analytical tools. Today several concepts
of measuring mismatch are present in literature. The most common are concepts of:
Jackman, Roper (1987); Jackman, Layard, Savouri (1991); Lillien (1982) and
Lambert (1988). The fundamental shortage of all mismatch indicators comes from
the fact that a unique definition of the concept of mismatch is still unavailable. In
continuation,weprovideatheoreticaloverviewoftheexistingmethodsofmeasuring
mismatch, and analyse their advantages and disadvantages.
3.1. Mismatch indicators based on intersectoral disequilibria
Jackman and Roper (1987) supplied the foundation for calculating mismatch
indicators based on Turvey’s most cited definition of the structural unemployment.
To make this definition operative in empirical estimations they specify the job hiring
function (H) or the matching function:
Hh u V
ii i i  (,) (1)
where Ui and Vi stand for the number of the unemployed and the vacancies in
category i (region, occupation, skill etc.), and hi is defined as: hi=Hi/Ni where Ni
stands for the number of the employed in category i. Matching function hi is linearly
homogeneousfunctionoftheunemployedandthevacancies.FunctionHisequaland
convex for all the regions i, and satisfies linear homogeneity:
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caused by mismatch decreases to zero when the total number of employed is
maximised
9.
According to Turvey (1977); Jackman and Roper (1987) define structural
unemployment as regional allocation of the existing number of the unemployed that,
along with regional allocation of vacancies, maximises aggregate employment:
max max max HH V h
U
V
ii i
i
i i i








   (3)
subject to that U
i
i  constant and Vi is given
10.
Considering that the necessary condition of the extreme value in equation (3) shows
that h'(Ui/V i)=const for all i, the only possible solution to the allocation problem is
that the ratio of the unemployed and the vacancies be equal in all regions. It means
that in this case there is a mismatch equilibrium (Jackman, et al., 1987: 11).
Furthermore, U1 /V 1=U2 /V 2=...=Uk /V k yielding u1=v1,u 2=v2...uk=vk, where ui=Ui /
iUi and vi=Vi / iVi. In other words, this means a portion of the unemployed in the
region i in relation to the total number of the unemployed in an economy and a
portion of vacancies in the region i in relation to the total number of vacancies in an
economy. According to the above mentioned, it follows that the natural way of
defining mismatch is:
, Mu v
ii i 1
1
2
  (4)
whosevalueiszeroifthereisnomismatch,i.e.whenlaboursupply isequaltolabour
demandinallregions(whenui=viforalli).Ifthenumbersoftheunemployed andthe
vacancies differ among regions, the value of regional mismatch indicator is between
0 and 1. The upper limit, M1=1, appears when all unemployment is concentrated in
one unique region and all vacancies are situated in another.
The mismatch indicator M1 is frequently used in empirical studies by Layard and
Nickell(1986), who havecalculatedtheabove mentionedindicators foroccupations,
regions and industries in Great Britain; Jackman and Roper (1987) who have
calculated the mentioned indicators for Great Britain, France and the Nordic
countries; and Boeri (1994) for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovak Republic, and Boeri and Scarpetta (1996) for Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic). Boeri and Scarpetta (1996),
emphasizethatthevalueofmismatchindicator M1intheselectedtransition countries
impliestheexistenceofaportionofstructuralunemploymentintotalunemployment.
That portion presents the number of unemployed workers (or vacancies) who should
Alka Obadiæ • Theoretical and empirical framework of measuring...
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9 That means that structural unemployment is brought down to minimum.
10 When Vi is given then Ui is variable.
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bereallocatedfromoneregiontoanotherinordertoachievestructuralequilibriumor
the situation of perfect matching. They have calculated the mismatch indicator M1
during the 1991-1994 time period in some transition countries and the obtained
results have shown that the rate of structural unemployment was 20% in Bulgaria,
38% in the Czech Republic, 27% in Hungary, 34% in Poland, around 30% in
Slovakia, and the highest figure of approximately 41% was recorded in Romania
(Boeri, et al., 1996: 237-238). The advantage of the mismatchindicator M1 lies in the
fact that the calculations included the values for the unemployed, the employed and
the vacancies for all regions. Therefore, M1 can be considered as a complete
mismatch measure.
This concept of mismatch indicator M1 could be graphically presented in the
following two-region model (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Portion of unemployment caused by mismatch
Source: modified according to Jackman, Roper (1987: 13)
Figure 1 shows the aggregate employment function (H) and the aggregate relation
betweentheunemploymentrate(u)andthevacancyrate(v).PointsAandBshowthe
values of the unemployed and vacancies (ui,v i) in both regions. The total value for u
and v in the entire economy is given by point F
11. In points A and B, the regional
values Ui /V i differ as well as the values of hiring hi. The mismatch equilibrium is
achievedalong thelineH
12,andinterregional exchange oftheunemployed hastolast
until some point on the line H is achieved. In that case, the portion of the
62
11 Itisassumedthatbothregionsareofthesamesize.Therefore,thepointFisinthemiddleofthedistanceAandB.
12 Line H presents the equilibrium vi=ui, because line H is presented at a 45o. In the original paper (Jackman,
Roper:1987)lineHisnotunder45o angle,butauthorsclaimthatthereisanequilibriumbetweenvianduionline
H. This is questionable therefore line H shown here is at angle of 45o.
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and D, where regional values Ui /V i are equal.
The curve AEB shows regional combinations of the unemployed (u) and vacancies
(v) at some hiring level, and describes the Beveridge curve
13. Values u and v reach
minimum in point E. At that point, regional and aggregate values Ui /V iequalize, as
well as regional and aggregate values of hiring, so mismatch is minimised. The
distance IG shows the value of unemployment caused by mismatch.
In order to calculatethat value, asin the caseof the mismatchindicator M1, the hiring
function of the Cobb-Douglas type of production function is used. This is a special
form of matching function that takes the following form:
HU V
ii i 
1
2
1
2,
and in aggregate form:
HH U Vu v
i
i
ii i i
i
  
1
2
1
2
1
2 () (5).
This form leads to the known shape of u/v curve (as in the case of isoquants by
Cobb-Douglas production function) and it is therefore a standard approximation in
empirical results. Some authors
14 argue for a selection of =1/2 in linear
homogeneous Cobb-Douglas hiring function. Total hiring in an economy is
maximised when the last term of the equation (5) equals 1. That is valid under the
assumption that all regional values Ui /V i areequal. Jackmanand Roper (Jackman,et
al., 1987: 13) use equation (5) to define the alternative mismatch indicator:
Mu v
ii i 2
1
2 1   () (6).
As in the equation (4) or mismatch indicator M1, the optimal allocation of
unemployment inside the regions is obtained when M2 is zero (ui=vi for all i). When
there is no matching at all, in other words when uivi=0 for all i, M2 acquires maximal
value 1 and existence of full mismatch is considered. It means that one region
contains all unemployed and other all vacancies. The portion of unemployment in
whole economy is 1-M2 in the equilibrium point E. The difference between real (U)
and equilibrium unemployment (U*) represents unemployment caused by mismatch
(see figure 1):
U-U
*=M2U
Alka Obadiæ • Theoretical and empirical framework of measuring...
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13 ThenegativerelationshipbetweentheunemployedandthevacancieswasfirstlyidentifybyWilliamBeveridgein
the 1940-ties.
14 Seemorein Layard,Nickell,Jackman(1991: 328), who have justified theirselection citing Pissarides (1986) and
Blanchard, Diamond (1990), and according to their own empirical proofs.
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The indicators M1 and M2 take into consideration the regional equilibrium on
condition of unchanged total demand. This also generates their disadvantages,
because cyclical oscillations of the mentioned mismatch indicators do not result
exclusively from the changes of structural factors, but from the different regional
effects on the side of the aggregate demand. Even when cyclical oscillations in all
regions have equal efficiency
15, it is possible to identify mismatch in the indicators
change. For example, it is possible for a region to be affected by a neutral negative
shock
16 on the demand side, which equally increase or decrease regional
unemployment and the number of vacancies. Figure 2 shows the influence of these
shocks on the demand side.
Figure 2: Increase of unemployment and vacancies in both regions
Source: Original made by author
Theincreaseofuiandviinboth regionsinfigure2isshownby theshiftoftheconvex
curve u/v to the northwest. Points A’ and B’ show regional values for u and v, and
point F’ the values for u and v in the entire economy after a change in demand. The
aggregate unemployment increases from (u) to (u’) while the unemployment caused
by mismatch increases from IG to IG	, by the value GG	, also represented by the
mismatch indicator M1
17. If the number of the unemployed is larger than the number
of vacancies, which is often the case in reality, M1 and M2 behave pro-cyclically.
3.2. Mismatch indicators based on NAIRU model
The main problem in measuring the above mentioned two indicators (M1 and M2)i s
the fact that for their calculation, vacancy data on disaggregated level is needed. This
64
15 That means that 1% change in total demand in one economy causes 1% change of demand in all regions.
16 Neutral negative shock presumes a shock that equally influences all regions.
17 Because of convexity of theu/v curve, absolute difference between unemploymentand vacancies increases, and
as a consequence the mismatch indicator M1 also increases.
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Savouri (1991) have suggested a third mismatch indicator, whose advantage is in a
fact that it is exclusively based on the numbers of the unemployed and the employed.
Therefore, data on vacancies is not needed for its calculation:
M
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var (7)
where Ui indicates a number of the unemployed and Ni a number of the employed
workers
18. This indicator comes from the NAIRU
19 theoretical framework, in other
words from the fact that long-term equilibrium is attained at minimal total
unemployment level. When a number of the unemployed is the same in all regions
then there is no mismatchand the value of the mismatchindicator M3 is zero. In other
cases,thevalueofthemismatchindicatorM3rangesfrom0and1(Pauer,2000:167).
Policy makers are usually interested only in the aggregate unemployment and they
arenotinexplainingeverysingledisaggregatedrate.Forexample,theyareinterested
if the increase in structural disequilibrium can explain the present high unem-
ployment in Europe. The presence of a unique indicator, which can estimate the
relationship between structural unemployment and average unemployment levels, is
questionable. The following analysis will offer an affirmative view.
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18 In calculating mismatchindicator M3 variance is used. Among measuresof dispersion it has the samemeaning as
arithmetic mean among middle values considering that all values of numerical variable participate in its
calculation. Therefore, it is considered a full measure of dispersion what is also its main advantage (Gujarati,
1992: 39-42). Amartya K. Sen has criticized a use of variance stressing that it depends on middle value. Such
imperfection does not exist by application a coefficient of variation (Sen, 1985: 31-32).
19 NAIRU - non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment.
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Figure 3: Mismatch indicator based on NAIRU framework
Source: Jackman, Layard, Savouri (1991: 68).
In the two-region model Figure 3 shows the function of the real wages (WW), which
is equal for both regions. In point A there is a long-term equilibrium and there is no
interregional migration, because unemployment rates in both regions are equal and
aggregate unemployment is equal to value A. That means that in point A
unemployment causedby mismatchisminimal.Theregional unemployment rate(ui)
andthetotalunemploymentrate(u
*)inpointAcoincide
20,whileregionaldifferences
in real wages correspond to differences in migration costs. The average level of real
wage is equal to the value W/P. If regional unemployment rates differ as in points C
and D, and if the average real wage remains unchanged, aggregate employment
(unemployment)decreases(increases)
21.Consideringthatregionaldifferencesinreal
wages do not correspond to the differences in migration costs, short-term
disequilibrium emerges. With interregional migrations and regional changes in real
wages new long-term equilibrium could be established. During this process of
adjustment, unemployment caused by mismatch in the amount of ee	 emerges, and
new equilibrium is established along the real wage curve (WW).
To derive the appropriate mismatch indicator, Jackman, Layard and Savouri (1991)
presuppose the Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale for
which nominal function of prices (P) is:
PW e
ii
A
i
i
i  




 
   ,1(8)
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20 The mentioned quantity of unemployment is equal to the distance from l to e.
21 The mentioned value is equal to the distance from l to e’ or to point B.
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and A is a composite index of technological progress and market competitiveness.
The technological progress (A) has a negative sign in this case, because increase in
productivity includes implicitly decrease in prices
22. By setting prices on unit level
23
and finding the logarithm of the equation (8), the price function gives expression for
possible real wage border:
AW
ii  log .
Furthermore, the function of real wages is assumed (Grubb (1986)):
log log Wu
ii i   , (9)
where  stays for real wage elasticity in relation to unemployment. By substituting
the wage function (9) in the price function (8) unemployment border appears:
Au
ii i i      log (10)
which shows all combinations of regional unemployment rates harmonized with
constant rate of inflation. Minimizing total unemployment at stable inflation
(NAIRU)couldbeillustratedbythefollowingtwo-regionalmodel(itisassumedthat
both regions are of equal size (1=2=1/2)).
Figure 4: Minimum total unemployment at stable inflation (NAIRU)
Source: modified according to Jackman, Layard, Savouri (1991: 69).
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22 This case is valid just under assumption of perfect competion. Considering that in the real world markets are not
perfect,enterpriseshavespecificmonopolypower,sotheincreaseinproductivityleadstotheincreaseinprices.
23 In that a way, constant price levels are assumed.
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The unemployment border is convex (see figure 4) and the lowest possible average
level of unemployment (umin) is in point P where unemployment is equal in both
regions (u1=u2). In that point there are no interregional migrations and
unemployment caused by mismatch is reduced to zero. If regional unemployment
rates differ, as seen in point P’, then total unemployment moves away from its
minimal value and is equal to u’. Aggregate unemployment is higher if
unemployment rates (ui) deviate more from each other. In that case, distance 	 uumin
indicates unemployment caused by mismatch. The re-establishment of long-term
equilibrium in point P is possible to attain only by interregional migrations, while,
according to the model assumption, the possibility of different real wages in each
region is excluded.
Furthermore, Jackman, Layard and Savouri, (1991: 70) derive the following
mismatch indicator defining unemployment value caused by mismatch:
M
u
u
i
4
1
2
 var (11)
where var stands for variance. Indicator M4 is zero when all regional unemployment
rates are equal to the aggregate one. In that case, labour supply and demand become
equal and thereisno mismatch.Calculating the degreeof mismatch(according to the
equation(11))inGreatBritainin1985,Jackman,LayardandSavourihavefoundthat
mismatch accounts for approximately around 30% of the total structural unem-
ployment, and hence its importance cannot be excluded (Jackman, et al. 1991: 71).
In contrast to the indicators M1 and M2, which behave procyclically in some
circumstances,theindicatorsM3andM4arestableattimesofregionalneutralshocks.
If the regional unemployment increases by the same amount as the aggregate
unemployment, due to negative shock on the demand side, the variance (ui /u )will
stay unchanged as well as a portion of unemployment caused by mismatch in
aggregate unemployment.
3.3. Mismatch indicators based on leading region
The mismatch indicators analysed so far are based on the assumption that wages in
each region depend solely on unemployment rates in a given region. If a situation of
high centralization of collective bargaining is assumed, it is expected that changes in
nominal wages in a leading region (i. e. a region with the lowest unemployment rate)
will have a dominant role when determining regional wages. Therefore, Jackman,
Layard and Savouri (1991) have assumed that wages depend merely on
unemployment rates in some leading regions (e.g., as the case is in the south of
England, or in the areas of some nations’ capitals), whose unemployment rates are
defined by uL. Thus, the following wage function is assumed:
log log Wu
ii L   (12)
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unemployment rate (uL). The function of unemployment border is derived from the
wage function:
Au
ii L   log (13).
This border also illustrates the lowest unemployment level (uL) in the entire
economy, because it is assumed that unemployment in other regions cannot be lower
than in a leading region. In the equilibrium
24, it is also valid that in no other region
unemployment can be lower than in a leading region, because real wages in a region
depend on unemployment uL and unemployment in each particular region does not
put pressure on wages in the same region. If unemployment in a region i is higher,
according to equation (12), it will not have any larger pressure on real wage Wi.I n
that case, interregional migrations appear, and last until all regional ui is equalized
with uL as well as with the total unemployment rate in an economy. Every deviation
of aggregate unemployment u from unemployment uL results from structural factors.
According to the above mentioned, a mismatch indicator M5 is derived
25:
Mu u
L 5  log log (14).
The definition of unemployment rate in leading regions states that the mismatch
indicator M5 is greater than the mismatch indicator measured according to the
assumption that wages depend on unemployment in the same region (the basic
model). The fact is, for certain groups of unemployment rates the minimum level of
unemployment is much larger in the case of the basic model than in the case of the
leading region (Jackman, et al., 1991: 73):
log log ,
min uu
ii i
i i
 




   1 .
The minimum level of unemployment (umin) is equal to the geometric mean of all
unemployment ratesin each region, while in the caseof the leading region the lowest
unemployment rate is uL. The gap between u and umin is larger in the model of the
leading region than in the basic model. The mentioned equilibrium in the case of the
leading region could be presented by Figure 5.
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24 In the equilibrium state the possibility of interregional migrations is omitted.
25 Wagesinaregion candepend on theunemploymentinthatregion (ui),aswellason unemploymentintheleading
region (uL): log Wi=i-1 log ui-2 log uL.
04_Obadic.prn
H:\Knjige\ekon-fax\124_06_zbornik_2006_1\04_Obadic.vp
6. lipanj 2006 10:40
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screenAlka Obadiæ • Theoretical and empirical framework of measuring...
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2006 • vol. 24 • sv. 1 • 55-80
Figure 5: Unemployment border in the leading region
Source: Jackman, Layard, Savouri (1991: 73)
In Figure 5 region 1 represents the leading region with unemployment rate umin.
Considering the assumption that the leading region has the lowest unemployment
rate, unemployment border is under rectangle (90
0 angle). In the equilibrium point P,
regional unemployment rates u1 and u2 are equal, so there is no interregional
migration and no mismatch. The total unemployment is equal to the unemployment
in the leading region. If unemployment in region 2 increases more than
unemploymentinregion1(u2>u1),thetotalunemploymentwillincreaseatthelevelu
in the point P’. As the decrease of real wages in region 2 cannot be equalized by the
aforementioned equilibrium according to the assumption of the model, the new
equilibrium is re-established by interregional migrations. The difference between
real aggregate unemployment (u) and minimum unemployment (umin) is equal to the
unemployment caused by mismatch.
As it is true for the mismatch indicators M3 and M4, the mismatch indicator M5 also
oftenshowsbasicfeaturethatitiseconomicallystableatmomentsofregionalneutral
shock impacts. Previously has been emphasized that indicators M1 and M2 behave
procyclically in such situations.
3.4. Theoretical considerations of mismatch methods
Finally, it could be concluded that theoretically, as mismatch measures, M1,M 2,M 3
and M4 are the most valuable mismatch indicators. By calculating these four
mismatch indicators, values for unemployment, employment and vacancies in real
and absolute amounts for all regions are used, and in such a way these indicators can
be considered as complete mismatch measures. In the case of the mismatch indicator
M5,thevalueforindicatoriscalculatedasadifferencebetweentotalaverageregional
unemployment rate and the lowest regional unemployment rate. In such a way, the
comparisonofallotherregionswithaverageregionalunemploymentrateisexcluded
70
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mismatch indicator M5would be more representative.
In calculating the mismatch indicators M1 and M2, unemployment and vacancy rates
for all regions are used, i. e. the values on the side of labour supply and demand. In
calculating the mismatchindicatorsM3 and M4 the values for the unemployed and the
employed are used, i. e. only the data on the labour supply side. Therefore, as the
most appropriate measure of adjustment in the labour market, mismatch indicators
M1 and M2are considered, because they simply show the functioning of supply and
demand in the market.
The fundamental disadvantage of all five mismatch indicators results from the fact
that there is still no unique definition of mismatch concept. This is also the main
reason, why several different methods for measuring mismatch indicators appear in
literature. This leads to very different empirical results about the actual
unemployment caused by mismatch. The theoretical framework, which includes
differentstartingvariablesinacalculationprocess,influencesthevalueofindicators.
Therefore, the obtained results for single indicators should be taken with caution, but
still it is important to stress that they show an adequate trend. This is also the main
reason why many authors calculated them. The results are more representative if
input data is more disaggregated according to regions and time (Pauer, 2000: 132).
4. Results - Empirical data analysis of mismatch indicators
Considering the fact that there is still no unique definition of the mismatch concept,
no unique methodofmeasuringmismatchindicators exists.Allmentionedindicators
above are derived from disaggregated level and an essential difference follows from
different input data used in their calculation. This is also the main reason why
different empirical results about the actual unemployment size caused by mismatch
doappear.Asthedifferencesinthesizeofgeographicunitsindifferentregionscould
affect the measure or regional mismatch, the EU methodology on regional level
according to NUTS level Regulation is used. The comparison according to level
NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 is used
26, as it is considered optimal for planning and regional
analysis, because of their intermediate role between state and local authorities.
For calculating mismatch indicators M1 and M2 disaggregated data on the
unemployed and vacancies are used. The indicator M3 uses data on the unemployed
and the employed, while indicators M4 and M5 use merely the data on unemployed
workers. Yearly regional data was used in calculations. The analysed period differs
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26 In the case of small countries according to number of population and surface, the level NUTS 2 designates
country. In the case of transition countries, such are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia and Slovenia. In the EU
that is a case for Denmark and Netherlands. The size of Malta and Cypar is so small that regional division
according to NUTS level regulation does not exist. Mentioned administrative distribution is also one of Acquis
communautaire conditions or precondition for EU membership and receiving assistance from EU structural
funds.
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according to the data availability for each country. Indicators show the existence of
regional maladjustment between vacancies and the unemployed or the existence of
structural unemployment in total unemployment (Boeri, et al., 1998: 20). In the
following tables all previously mentioned mismatch indicators by region for the
selected transition countries are calculated. Only a few authors have conducted the
research on mismatch indicators for the transition countries. Boeri and Scarpetta
calculated some variation of mismatch indicator M1 (Boeri, 1994: 10-11; Scarpetta,
1995: 57), while other mismatch indicators were not measured. Therefore, the
importance of these results is even more significant.
Table 1: Empirical results for particular mismatch indicators according to disaggregated
data by 14 macro-regions, Czech Republic, 1992-2002
Year M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1993 0.35 0.11 0.006 0.19 0.73
1994 0.33 0.09 0.007 0.26 0.75
1995 0.30 0.07 0.007 0.31 0.73
1996 0.31 0.08 0.015 0.31 0.73
1997 0.26 0.06 0.016 0.26 0.62
1998 0.25 0.05 0.020 0.23 0.49
1999 0.26 0.05 0.021 0.21 0.39
2000 0.26 0.05 0.015 0.19 0.39
2001 0.29 0.06 0.015 0.23 0.39
2002 0.29 0.06 0.024 0.25 0.39
Source: for number of unemployed - Unemployment Development in CR, Monthly Statistics reports,
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, Employment Service
Administration; for unemployed - Labour Market in the Czech Republic 1993-2002, Czech
Statistical Office, Prague, 2002; for vacancies - Monthly Statistics reports, Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, Employment Service Administration
Asmentionedearlier,becauseoflackofauniquedefinition ofmismatchandbecause
of the problems of data using it was expected that the results of some indicators
would be different. This is also confirmed in the case of the Czech Republic. It is
stressed that indicators from M1 to M4 could be considered representative, since all
values for the needed variables by region were used in the calculations. It is worth
mentionine that all results should be taken with a caution, but their trend shows the
actual state of the regional labour market. In the case of the Czech Republic, giving
any evaluations is hard, because during the observed period M1 and M2 decreased,
and M3 and M4 increased. However it is possible to conclude that the increase of
indicators M3 and M4 is slightly larger than the decrease of indicators M1 and M2.
Therefore, it can be concluded that in spite of the lowest unemployment rates among
72
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regional maladjustment in the Czech Republic.
Table 2: Empirical results for particular mismatch indicators according to disaggregated
data by 21 macro-regions, Croatia, 1993-2002
Year M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1993 0.21 0.028 0.14 0.34 0.65
1994 0.21 0.029 0.06 0.32 0.68
1995 0.20 0.027 0.07 0.29 0.68
1996 0.23 0.036 0.04 0.25 0.69
1997 0.24 0.039 0.03 0.25 0.73
1998 0.23 0.033 0.03 0.24 0.69
1999 0.21 0.026 0.02 0.23 0.67
2000 0.18 0.024 0.02 0.23 0.65
2001 0.17 0.019 0.02 0.23 0.63
2002 0.15 0.017 0.01 0.23 0.63
Source: Croatian Employment Office Database
In Croatia’s case the trend of all indicators is the same and shows that in the period
from 1993 until 2002 the regional mismatch has decreased (see Table 2). The largest
differencesamongthevaluesoftheparticularindicatorscanbeidentifiedinindicator
M4 ranging from 0,34 to 0,23 during last ten years. Though it was not expected that
during that time period the regional mismatch would decrease, but the measured
indicators show that these regional maladjustment in Croatia’s labour market have
decreased. According to the NUTS level Regulation, Croatia and Slovenia as a
country are considered to be at NUTS 2 level and their regions (counties) are at
NUTS 3 level. At the level NUTS 3 in Croatia some smaller territorial parts
(municipalities) were affected by war and some were not, so if the NUTS 3 level
division would betreatedasadifferentsetofregions, smallerterritoriallevelsshould
be taken into account
27. In such way mismatchconcept analysis in Croatia would not
be comparable with other countries in a selected group.
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27 It was not possible to use NUTS 3 division for the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, because 3 main
indicators are not recorded in this countries at such disaggregated level.
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Table 3: Empirical results for particular mismatch indicators according to disaggregated
data by 21 macro-regions, Poland, 1992-2001
Year M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1992 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.39
1993 0.12 0.02 0.005 0.06 0.39
1994 0.06 0.004 0.002 0.07 0.40
1995 0.07 0.004 0.003 0.07 0.42
1996 0.07 0.003 0.002 0.06 0.42
1997 0.06 0.003 0.003 0.06 0.38
1998 0.06 0.004 0.004 0.06 0.38
1999 0.07 0.005 0.005 0.06 0.35
2000 0.07 0.005 0.005 0.06 0.38
2001 0.09 0.006 0.007 0.06 0.38
Source: Database of Central Statistical Office, Warsaw
In the case of Poland, similar to Croatia, all mismatch indicators in the observed
period show that the regional maladjustment has decreased. It could be noticed that
oscillations of all regional mismatch indicators during the selected period are very
small,especiallyinthecaseofindicatorsM4andM5,whichhavenotchangedatall.
Table 4: Empirical results for particular mismatch indicators according to the disaggregated
data by 8 macro-regions, Slovakia, 1997-2002
Year M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1997 0.19 0.03 0.007 0.056 0.361
1998 0.15 0.02 0.016 0.055 0.349
1999 0.17 0.02 0.021 0.052 0.324
2000 0.12 0.01 0.005 0.053 0.319
2001 0.07 0.004 0.006 0.058 0.349
2002 0.09 0.007 0.008 0.063 0.378
Source: National Labour Office - Bratislava
In Slovakia the regional mismatchindicators M1 and M2 have decreased. At the same
time, a small increase of mismatch indicators M3-M5 occurred and a mismatch
indicatorM5relativelyincreasedtothegreatestextent.Byexaminingallindicators,it
could be concluded that the trend of their decrease is larger than the trend of their
74
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maladjustment in Slovakia was reduced.
Table 5: Empirical results for particular mismatch indicators according to disaggregated
data by 8 macro-regions, Slovenia, 1990-2002
Year M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1990 0.15 0.015 0.009 0.282 0.45
1991 0.09 0.006 0.019 0.285 0.47
1992 0.11 0.008 0.009 0.312 0.37
1993 0.12 0.293 0.015 0.32 0.38
1994 0.13 0.004 0.012 0.319 0.41
1995 0.17 0.005 0.006 0.322 0.40
1996 0.19 0.022 0.003 0.307 0.44
1997 0.16 0.015 0.008 0.277 0.46
1998 0.16 0.015 0.005 0.292 0.49
1999 0.18 0.021 0.003 0.293 0.54
2000 0.16 0.017 0.003 0.288 0.54
2001 0.17 0.018 0.003 0.281 0.53
2002 0.17 0.016 0.003 0.27 0.54
Source: National Data Base from Employment Office in Ljubljana
In case of Slovenia, the mismatch indicators M3 and M4 have decreased, while all
other indicators increased which shows that regional mismatch has increased in
Slovenia during the observed period. The mismatchindicator M5has increased to the
utmost, wherewith it is shown that in the previous period the differences in the
movementbetweenthe lowestregional and the averagetotal regional unemployment
rates increased.
The following figure (see Figure 6) shows the revised images of all previously
calculated mismatch indicators (M1-M5) for the selected transition countries in the
observed time period.
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Figure 6: Mismatch indicators of selected transition countries
Source: according to the tables from 1 to 5
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One reason for high stable unemployment rates and low participation in the labour
force of the selected transition countries seems to be the mismatch between the
regional distribution of unemployed persons and available vacancies.The problemis
that in the absence of large interregional migration flows the regional mismatch
between the processes of job destruction and job creation has resulted in a rapid
build-up of persistent structural unemployment. Such a situation is even more
common in transition countries that have been increasingly affected by the
restructuring process during the 1990s.
The results of the empirical analysis confirm the expectations and show some
differencesin the measuredvalues for somemismatchindicators. Itisobvious that in
allselectedtransitioncountriesthevaluesoftheparticularmismatchindicatorsdiffer
considerably. Therefore, it is very hard to estimate the real size of structural unem-
ployment, in other words unemployment caused by mismatch. Generally speaking,
themeasuredvaluesofallmismatchindicatorsintheselectedcountriesdonotoffera
conclusion, but can show adequate trends.
Namely, only in case of Croatia and Poland the values of all mismatch indicators in
the selectedperiod decreased,and in Poland the smallestoscillation in the movement
of the mismatch indicator M5 was identified, which shows a small decrease in
structural unemployment. Therefore, it canbesaidthat in the lastdecadethe regional
mismatch in Croatia and Poland have slightly decreased, as a consequence of better
regional matching. In Slovenia the values for all mismatch indicators, except for
indicators M3 and M4, have increased. In comparison to other countries in the
observed period the values for the mismatch indicators M5 are the highest in Croatia.
Its value shows the differences in the movements among the lowest regional and
average regional unemployment rates. The conclusion follows that the largest
regional differences in regional mismatch movements have been noticed in Croatia.
Considering that indicator M5 was relatively large during the whole observed period
the existence of steady regional differences in Croatia is confirmed. In context to the
mismatch indicator M5, regional differences between the regions with the lowest
unemployment rate and the average unemployment rate increased in Slovenia and
decreased in the Czech Republic. Analysing all five mismatchindicators together for
Slovakia, it could be concluded that the decreasing trend is larger than the increasing
trend. Thus, the final conclusion is that during the observed period a slight decrease
in regional maladjustment has appeared in Slovakia.
To sum up, the empirical results and their analysis have shown that the existence of
the standard regional mismatch points to a problem of increased overall
unemployment in allselectedtransition countries during theobserved period. Except
forthestandardregionalmismatch,itisobvious thattheoverallemploymenthasalso
decreased due to the efficiency of technology matching. Therefore, future analyses
should concern the empirical disaggregated estimation of the matching function.
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Teorijski i empirijski okvir mjerenja mismatch-a na tr ištu rada
Alka Obadiæ
1
Sa etak
Istra ivanje u radu je usmjereno na rastuæi problem strukturne nezaposlenosti u
odabranoj skupini tranzicijskih zemalja. Naime, ukoliko odreðena regija ima višu
stopu nezaposlenosti od frikcijske i ukoliko druga regija ima veæi broj slobodnih
radnih mjesta nego u uvjetima frikcijske nezaposlenosti, navedeno ukazuje na
postojanjestrukturneneravnote eilimismatch-a.Takavtipnezaposlenostinazivase
strukturna nezaposlenost. Procjene jasno pokazuju kako se mismatch-om mo e
objasniti samo dio postojeæe nezaposlenosti, te se mo e smatrati faktorom rastuæe
nezaposlenosti. Empirijski dio istra ivanja odnosi se na mjerenje strukturne
nezaposlenosti uzrokovane regionalnim mismatch-om putem poznatih teorijskih
metoda mismatch indikatora u odabranoj skupini tranzicijskih zemalja. Empirijski
rezultati komparativno ukazuju kako se vrijednosti pojedinih mismatch indikatora u
velikoj mjeri razlikuju. Stoga je teško procijeniti stvarnu velièinu strukturne
nezaposlenosti. Izmjerene vrijednosti za sve mismatch indikatore ne mogu pru iti
jedinstven zakljuèak, ali ukazuju na odgovarajuæi trend.
Kljuène rijeèi: tr ište rada, strukturna nezaposlenost, regija, mismatch, tranzicijske
ekonomije
JEL klasifikacija: J41, J61, J63, O57
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